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THE MORAL HAZARD OF THE ESTATE TAX 
CAROLYN C. JONES1 
 
Basic elements of our federal tax system – the income and estate taxes – emerged 
from the social debates of the Progressive era. Andrew Carnegie, in his famous 
essay, “Wealth,” placed individual morality against a backdrop of social and 
community need.  He praised the heavy taxation of large estates left at death as the 
means by which “the state marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire’s 
unworthy life.”2  Carnegie had a clear notion of the moral path for the wealthy.  First, 
“the man of Wealth” should “set an example of modest, unostentatious living”, and 
then “provide moderately for the legitimate wants of those dependent on him.”  All 
surplus revenues should be considered “simply as trust funds” to be administered 
according to his judgment in the manner “best calculated to produce the most 
beneficial results for the community.”3  Carnegie saw “the man of Wealth” as “ the 
mere agent and trustee for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior 
wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them better than they would 
or could do for themselves.”4  The passage of federal income taxes and estate taxes 
in the early twentieth century resulted in part from beliefs about morality.5  The 
focus was upon the moral obligations of the wealthy to those less fortunate. For 
Carnegie, at least, death was the point of reckoning on that score and death taxation a 
moral instrument.  
                                                                
1Carolyn Jones is a Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law.  I 
would like to thank Tom Baker and Carol Weisbrod, the participants in the Death of the 
“Death Tax”? Conference at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and the Faculty Workshop 
at the University of Connecticut School of Law for comments on earlier versions of this essay.  
Research support from the University of Connecticut School of Law is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, NORTH AM. REV. 659 (June 1889). 
3Id. at 661-62. 
4Id. at 662.  For an analysis of the degree to which the wealthy of the late nineteenth 
century engaged in philanthropy, see Merle Curti, Judith Green & Roderick Nash, Anatomy of 
Giving: Millionaires in the Late 19th Century, 15 AM. Q. 416, 419 (1963).  The authors 
concluded that self-made men were more philanthropic than those who had inherited wealth.  
Id. at 429-30. 
5See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 316-17 (9th ed. 1923). 
(“. . .[T]he government cannot derive any revenue . . . without inevitably affecting 
social relations . . . .  The distinguishing mark of modern social science is that it 
endeavors to explain not only what is, but also what should be.  All practical action is 
thus brought to the crucible of justice, and all systems of taxation are put to the test of 
conformity with this principle, irrespective of the intentions of the legislature.”). 
For a treatment of moral considerations surrounding tax policy see JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE III & 
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR., TAX JUSTICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:  RECONSIDERING THE MORAL AND 
ETHICAL BASIS OF TAXATION (forthcoming 2002). 
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The current debate about wealth transfer taxation has its themes of morality as 
well.  Opponents have labeled the tax as “‘immoral”.6  Taxation is about morality.  It 
is both useful and necessary to consider moral arguments in the debate about the 
estate tax.  In an area largely consigned to economists and philosophers, it is 
beneficial to broaden perspectives.  One could expand the range of academic 
disciplines considered―to history, psychology, and sociology, for example.  One 
should also take into account the narratives of those affected by the issue.7 
This essay can only probe into this question.  Beginning with Andrew Carnegie 
and the similar sentiments of his contemporaries, one can imagine the landscape 
against which Carnegie surveyed the estate tax as including the super rich and the 
rest of society―both classes with their interests and roles to play.  Those labeling the 
estate tax as immoral today can be described as focusing more particularly upon the 
decedent (her goals or habits) and the villain of the piece―the government―the tax 
collector.  This shift in frame is fundamental to today’s debate on the morality of 
                                                                
6Republican lawmakers have condemned the estate tax as immoral. See, e.g., Richard W. 
Stevenson, Veto of the Estate-Tax Repeal Survives Vote in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2000, at A22, col. 1 (Rep. Jennifer Dunn called the estate tax an “immoral, unfair, and 
economically unsound tax.”); Jackie Koszczuk, Senate OKs inheritance tax repeal, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE, July 15, 2000, at A-1 (Sen. Phil Gramm stated “Republicans believe that is 
unfair, that is un-American and that is immoral.”); Jake Thompson, Benefits of Repealing the 
Estate Tax Debated, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 13, 2000, at 1 (“Whether it’s a farm, ranch 
or store, [Sen. Chuck] Hagel said, taxing it after death is immoral.”).  Such sentiments have 
been expressed in letters to editors. 
Academics have also argued that the estate tax is immoral.  See Edward McCaffery & 
Richard Wagner, A Bipartisan Declaration of Independence from Death Taxation, TAX 
NOTES, August 7, 2000, at 801; Edward McCaffery, In Favor of Repeal, in Edward J. 
McCaffery, Charles Davenport & James Halpern, Should We End Life Support for Death 
Taxes?, TAX NOTES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1373; Edward J. McCaffery, Grave Robbers: The 
Moral Case Against the Death Tax, TAX NOTES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 1429. McCaffery’s articles 
argue for a progressive consumption tax.  Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid 
Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy 
Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); see also Edward J. McCaffery, 
Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71 (1996).  For an article agreeing that taxation is “fundamentally 
a moral issue”, but reaching a different result as to the morality of the estate tax, see Dennis J. 
Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk About the “Death” Tax: Politics, Economics and Morality, TAX 
NOTES, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1159.  Taxation is of course, not the only area of law with concerns 
about the degree and extent of moral discourse.  For example, see Carl E. Schneider, 
Marriage, Morals and the Law:  No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 
503; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985). 
7Carolyn C. Jones, Mapping Tax Narratives, 73 TUL. L. REV. 653 (1998).  One factor to 
consider in the use of narratives is the attention to direct cause and effect.  When one considers 
the stories of those subject to taxation, narratives can be useful.  It is more difficult to narrate 
the story of those whose lives may be improved because of the expenditure of wealth transfer 
tax revenues.  This can have an unfortunate class-based effect.  One illustration of the problem 
can be found in the use of tax narratives in the woman suffrage campaign.  Carolyn C. Jones, 
Dollars and Selves: Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 1870s, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
265, 300-06 (1994). 
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estate taxation.8  My project is to consider such moral arguments more seriously than 
many estate tax opponents have.  We can see in the opposition to the estate tax 
connections with deep seated cultural and social values.  However, the stories are not 
simple, and different arguments advanced about the immorality of the tax are not 
particularly consonant. 
For me, a concept important to another area of law - insurance -  has been useful 
in structuring my understanding of the estate tax immorality arguments.  This 
concept is “moral hazard.”  One can draw an analogy between estate taxation and life 
insurance.  The contention that estate taxation is immoral is based in part on the 
repugnant mixture of the sacred and the profane.  The moment of death and its 
aftermath raise questions of the sacred.  Opponents see the government as a profane 
opportunist making death a money-making (taxable) event.  Similarly, life insurance 
faced a very difficult start in the United States in the early nineteenth century. Why? 
It was viewed as a foul mixture of the sacred and profane with gambling thrown in 
for good measure.  Insurance scholars, also writing about intersections of death, 
money and morality, can provide a deeper appreciation of the cultural valences 
involved. 
Sociologist Viviana Zelizer in her book Morals and Markets described the 
problem.   
The growth of individualism resulted in a new respect for the infinite 
worth of human personality, displacing the earlier utilitarianism with an 
absolute valuation of human beings. In an increasingly industrialized 
market economy dominated by the “cash nexus,” human life and human 
feelings were culturally segregated into their separate incommensurable 
realm.  Life insurance threatened the sanctity of life by pricing it. 
Insurance was uncomfortably reminiscent of the primitive institution of 
the wergild, or “blood-money” when the murder of a man was restituted 
with the payment of money.  Thus, the financial evaluation of a man’s life 
introduced by the industry was initially rejected by many as a profanation 
which transformed the sacred event of death into a vulgar commodity.9 
Related to the moral problem of incommensurability of money and life, was 
another issue―moral hazard.  During the nineteenth century, fire insurance 
companies were concerned about coverage not only of physical hazards but also of 
“moral hazards.”  Those of weak or bad character were susceptible to temptation.  
                                                                
8I know that this phrase probably gives me away.  If I were an estate tax opponent, I would 
be discussing the immorality of the death tax. The use of “death tax” is often credited to 
Republican pollster Frank Luntz (or, some would say, Frank Luntz has taken credit for this 
move).  Luntz has said that he persuaded Trent Lott and other Republican lawmakers to use 
“death tax” when advocating the repeal of federal wealth transfer taxes. Peter Stone, Man with 
a Message, 29 NAT’L J. 750 (1997).  Luntz’s rhetorical move is consistent with the importance 
he places on language:  As he claimed in GOPAC guide:  “Words are everything.  They can 
declare war or define a peace.  They can soothe or inflame . . . We have found the words and 
phrases that will move the American people.”  Id. In one poll by Luntz Research Companies in 
1999, 69% of those polled viewed death and inheritance taxes as unfair.  Charles D. Fox IV, 
Repeal of Estate and Gift Tax: Rising Tide or High-Water Mark?, 139 TR. & EST. 56 (2000).  
9VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 150-51 (1983). 
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Even people of good character could be tempted by the insurance relationship itself. 
Tom Baker, in his article On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, has skillfully traced 
the evolution of this nineteenth century character-based concept of moral hazard into 
its late twentieth century incarnation.  Today, moral hazard is used to argue that there 
are “perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life”, 
and these harmful externalities suggest that redistribution should be limited.10 
The notion of moral hazard provides a useful grid to explore the morality of the 
death tax.  Contemporary opposition to the tax may be viewed through this lens of 
moral hazard.  Baker’s very rich analysis enables us to see that both the nineteenth 
century character-based approach and the more recent economic externalities 
approach are at work in moral thinking about the estate tax. 
This essay begins with character-based arguments by first illustrating this 
approach within the field of insurance.  This character theme is then translated into 
the realm of taxation.  Taking the current focus on decedents and their beneficiaries 
as a given for this part of the essay, one asks “Is the government tempted to do 
wrong, to act immorally, because of the existence of the estate tax?”   
A story from World War I suggests the government’s own concerns on this front 
with regard to taxing the estates of servicemen killed in wartime.  That sense of the 
government as bad actor extends to more mundane deaths as estate taxation is seen 
to be interfering with the achievement of a decedent’s plans.  Human beings have 
very important connections to their property.  Does this form of taxation interfere 
with symbolic immortality?  The estate tax with its tax base of fair market value 
generally takes an undifferentiated view of property.  Scholars have perceived 
complicated relationships with different sorts of property, relationships in some cases 
that are constitutive of personality and expressive of life’s goals.  When the 
government, by taxation, disrupts these relationships and social meanings, is the 
government’s behavior immoral? 
A second moral hazard analysis moves from moral questions which posit the 
government as a greedy insured to the government in the role of insurance company 
“redistributing wealth.”  By taxing those who have saved to build an estate, the 
government is said to reduce the incentive to save and invest–creating a perverse 
incentive to spend.  This is Baker’s contemporary version of moral hazard–“the 
perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life.”  The 
writings of those who have considered the morality of spending during the twentieth 
century can considerably enrich this moral hazard argument.  Indeed, some writers 
have argued against oversaving and have encouraged spending, particularly spending 
for culture and refinement.11 
                                                                
10Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).  For 
purposes of this essay, I am defining an externality as “aris[ing] when the decisions of some 
economic agents―whether in production, in consumption, or in exchange―affect other 
economic agents in ways that do not set up legally recognized rights of compensation or 
redress.”  Externalities can be harmful or beneficial.  JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 484 (3d ed. 1976). 
11Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Americans have been urged to 
express their patriotism by shopping.  See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, The Trivial Assumes 
Symbolism of Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at 1B.  One conceptual problem, of course, 
is in the definition of spending, as opposed to saving and in the iteration of categories of 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/7
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Finally, the question of framing returns.  If the moral actor is no longer the 
government, but the wealthy person, the Progessive Era arguments for an estate tax 
return. Carnegie would argue that the wealthy man with no philanthropic impulse 
should be condemned as a person of bad character.  The positive externalities of 
estate taxation are rarely described in the compendium of tales of the IRS.  Just as 
duties to oneself, to one’s family and to society in general are all implicated in a 
consideration of mortality and morality in the insurance field, so these same issues 
arise with respect to estate taxation. 
I.  LIFE, DEATH AND MORAL HAZARD 
The nineteenth century insurance trade used the term “moral hazard” to describe 
both people (“negligent and fraudulent insureds”) and situations (those inviting what 
an Aetna Guide to Fire Insurance called “carelessness and roguery.”).12  While these 
concerns were often discussed in the context of property insurance, similar concerns 
arose with respect to life insurance.13 
A.  The Example of Child Life Insurance 
Perhaps one of the most vivid illustrations of this concern with moral hazard can 
be found in the example of child life insurance.  In the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, insurance companies found that they could successfully market child life 
insurance costing a few pennies per week.14  The purchasers were working-class or 
poor families who were interested in an alternative to pauper burial.15  As the 
companies sold more policies, child protection groups opposed child insurance as 
“an offensive symbol of the prevalent materialistic orientation toward childhood” 
and the companies that sold such policies as having “child-blood” on their hands.16  
A newspaper article in 1878 portrayed children’s insurance as a “dangerous incentive 
to murder . . . .  It is not only the inducement which inhuman parents . . . find in 
insurance on their children to ill treat them or put them out of the way, but it is the 
tendency to cause them to neglect their children in their sickness and . . . the 
demoralizing effect produced by parents speculating on the lives of their children.”17  
Poor and working class parents who stood to benefit from the policies were seen as 
moral hazards―people of low character, incipient murderers who would kill (or at 
                                                          
spending.  Outlays of money (for education, for example) may have current consumption 
benefits while building human capital. 
12Tom Baker, Insuring Morality, 29 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 559, 562 (2000). 
13VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 67-89 (1983).  “For many, life insurance not only offended 
religious sensitivities, but weakened the very fiber of society by institutionalizing gambling 
and encouraging murder for money.”  Id. at 79. 
14VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF 
CHILDREN 114, 118 (1994). 
15Id. at 114-15. 
16Id. at 118. 
17Id.  Over time as child mortality rates dropped child insurance continued to be sold, not 
so much as burial insurance, but as a “nest egg” or an endowment for a child at age sixteen or 
twenty-one.  Id. at 132-37. 
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least fail to get medical help for an ailing child).  Efforts to outlaw child insurance 
were premised  both on the elimination of temptation and on keeping the death of a 
child from resulting in pecuniary compensation.  Parents were seen as moral hazards 
capable of causing their children’s deaths. 
About two decades after these campaigns to outlaw child insurance, a 
comparable story of tax moral hazard emerged.18 
B.  The Example of World War I - Government as Moral Hazard 
On April 7, 1917, the United States entered World War I.19  In the following 
month, Congress passed the Selective Service Act authorizing the registration and 
draft of all men between twenty-one and thirty years of age.20  A few months later, 
Congress enacted a War Estate Tax, to be imposed in addition to a regular estate 
tax.21  The new War Estate Tax contained a provision exempting those “dying while 
serving in the military or naval forces of the United States during the continuance of 
the war in which the United States is now engaged, or if death results from injuries 
received or disease contracted in such service, within one year after the termination 
of such war.”22  The Senate Finance Committee was concerned about the estate tax 
as an emergency measure.23  “Particularly, is it to be remembered that perhaps a 
majority of those dying during the war and leaving estates to be taxed will be 
soldiers and sailors dying in defense of our country.”24 
As it turned out, the influenza of 1918 coincided with the last months of World 
War I.  While troops poured into crowded barracks and ships and as civilians moved 
about during the war, pandemic flu spread.  Over 43,000 soldiers and sailors died of 
the flu and pneumonia, constituting about eighty percent of American battle deaths.25  
                                                                
18ZELIZER, supra note 14, at 120-25.  In 1895, the Massachusetts Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children introduced a bill to outlaw insurance on the lives of children 
under ten years of age, although it was defeated. 
19Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German 
Government and the Government and People of the United States and making provision to 
prosecute the same. 40 Stat. 1 (Apr. 6, 1917). 
20Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76. 
21Revenue Act of October 3, 1917 [H.R. 4280], Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 901. 
22Id. at 87-88.  See also Edwin R. A. Seligman, The War Revenue Act, 33 POLITICAL 
SCIENCE Q. 1, 7 (1918). 
23
“Only if continued at the same rate for many years - the period of a generation - does it 
become equal for all persons in like situation.” Revenues to Defray War Expenses, Report to 
Accompany H.R. 4280, REP. No. 65-103, at 14 (1917). 
24Id. In the Revenue Act of 1918, all estate tax obligations were relieved for those soldiers 
and sailors dying during the war as a result of war injuries or disease.  The 1917 Act had 
merely exempted them from the supplemental war estate tax.  Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 
Stat. 1057 (1919). 
25ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918, 206 
(1989). 
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In all, about 550,000 Americans succumbed to this Spanish influenza and its 
complications.26 
Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin painted a somewhat different view of the 
identity of those likely to pay wealth taxes.  He pointed out that “two percent of the 
people of this country own sixty-five percent of its wealth.”27  Like many 
progressives of his time, LaFollette saw big business pushing the United States into 
war in order to accumulate vast profits.28  One of his Senatorial colleagues called war 
profiteers the “blood sucking tarantula upon the American people.”29  LaFollette 
wondered, “Is it too much to ask that the taxes of this war should be paid for so far as 
possible out of the great wealth of these two million people, particularly as the 
people of the poorer class will be more largely drawn upon for soldiers to suffer and 
die in unestimated numbers in order that the war may be prosecuted?”30  
To many during World War I, the government was an accomplice to profiteering 
corporations, using war to boost corporate revenues.  American soldiers and sailors 
were seen as dying for money.  The government, in drafting men, required a sacrifice 
of time and, in some cases, of life itself.  The sense that it would be too much to tax 
the estates of military personnel was not really disputed.  Like the parents of insured 
working children, the government could be seen as a moral hazard, profiting from 
death it had compelled.  The imposition of the newly enacted estate tax on the estate 
of those dying in their country’s service was seen as immoral. 
C.  Government Interference With Symbolic Immortality 
To the contemporary opponents of the estate tax, the problem of government 
immorality is not based upon profiteering upon wartime death, but rather upon more 
general issues of the identity of the deceased and his or her relation to property.  As 
one opponent put it: 
The estate tax is immoral and dishonors the hard work of people who have 
passed on. Something is sacred about the fruits of your parents’ labor, and 
you have a deep sense to protect it.  This is their legacy and it is 
representative of what their life is all about.  This tax violates the sanctity 
of those efforts and the government should not take part of it.31 
                                                                
26Id. at 207.  Katherine Anne Porter’s novella Pale Horse, Pale Rider described the flu’s 
effect on the narrator as she lost her lover and became afflicted herself.  KATHERINE ANNE 
PORTER, PALE HORSE, PALE RIDER: THREE SHORT NOVELS (1939). 
27H.R. REP. NO. 65-103, pt.2, at 11 (1917). 
28These views were advanced by peace activists and socialists.  See Carolyn C. Jones, 
Taxes and Peace: A Case Study of Taxing Women, 6 S. CAL. REV. OF LAW AND WOMEN’S 
STUDIES 361, 387-90 (1997).  Some of these concerns led to the adoption of World War I’s 
excess profits tax.  W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists and the Formation of the Modern Tax 
System in the United States: the World War I Crisis, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC 
KNOWLEDGE 401 (Mary O. Furner & Barry Supple eds., 1990). 
29RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 116 (1954). 
30Id. at 11-12. 
31John Meagher of the House Ways and Means Committee quoted in Kerri Houston, A 
Morally, Economically Bankrupt Tax, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 11, 1999, at A22. 
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The connection between human beings and the material world was a recurring 
theme for twentieth century intellectuals. Sociologist Georg Simmel described 
ownership “as an acting with and upon” things.”32  In 1900, he wrote: 
To understand the concept of property it is decisive to recognize that the 
rigid demarcation between it and the self, between internal and external 
life, is quite superficial and that it should be made more fluid for the 
purpose of a deeper interpretation.  On the one hand, the whole 
significance of property lies in the fact that it releases certain emotions 
and impulses of the soul, while on the other hand the sphere of the Ego 
extends both over and into these ‘external’ objects just as the process in 
the mind of the violinist or the painter is continually transferred to the 
movement of the violin’s bow or the brush.  Just as the possession of any 
external object would be meaningless if it did not have a psychic value, 
so, at the same time, the Ego would collapse and lose its dimensions if it 
were not surrounded by external objects which become the expression of 
its tendencies, its strength and its individual manner because they obey or, 
in other words, belong to it.33 
The connections between people and things have been seen as extending across 
time and through generations.  French historian Philippe Ariès in his essay “Western 
Attitudes Toward Death” traces the evolution of such thought from the Middle Ages 
to the present.  His survey found that, for modern Western families, “even when they 
believed in the afterlife . . . death became the unaccepted separation, the death of the 
other, “thy death,” the death of the loved one.”  In our day, he said, “death has 
become unnameable.  Everything henceforth goes on as if neither I nor those who 
are dear to me are any longer mortal.”34 
If death is unacceptable and unnameable, immortality in its various forms is a 
solution.  Things have a role in that story.  Behavioral scientist Mihaly 
Csikzentmihalyi and sociologist Eugene Rochberg-Halton described that 
interrelationship: 
When an object is imbued with qualities of the self, it expresses the being 
of that person, whether in written words or a chair that was crafted or a 
photograph.  It becomes an objectified form of consciousness no less than 
words spoken into someone’s ear, all forming part of the social self.  
Through these objects a part of the self comes to be embodied in the 
consciousness of others and will continue to exist long after the 
consciousness that molded them has ceased to exist.  Perhaps the clearest 
example is when a number of people gather to mourn for someone at a 
wake or funeral.  These people―family, kin, and friends of the departed 
person―are the living representation of the deceased.  Although the 
personal self has ceased to exist, the social self has a continued existence 
                                                                
32GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 321 (David Frisby ed., 2d ed. 1990) (1907). 
33Id. at 322-34. 
34PHILIPPE ARIÈS, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE 
PRESENT 106-07 (Patricia M. Ranom trans., 1974). 
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in those who will remember and through those artifacts that in whatever 
way give testimony to that person.35 
Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Olson have seen five modes of symbolic immortality, two 
of which are especially relevant to the estate tax debate.  First is biological 
immortality―living on through children, although this can also be characterized as 
“biosocial immortality”―“the continuity of one’s family and other social 
groupings.”36  They also identify a creative mode of symbolic immortality―one 
expressed as human works.37 
For human beings the translation of spirit into thing is critical to the maintenance 
of human culture.  Hannah Arendt wrote of this in The Human Condition: 
The whole factual world of human affairs depends for its reality and its 
continued existence, first, upon the presence of others who have seen and 
heard and will remember, and second, on the transformation of the 
intangible into the tangibility of things.  Without remembrance and 
without the reification which remembrance needs for its own fulfilment 
and which makes it, indeed, as the Greeks held, the mother of all arts, the 
living activities of action, speech and thought would lose their reality at 
the end of each process and disappear as though they had never been. . . . 
The reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact 
that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by 
which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the 
lives of their authors.  Human life, in so far as it is world-building, is 
engaged in a constant process of reification, and the degree of worldliness 
of produced things, which all together form the human artifice, depends 
upon their greater or lesser permanence in the world itself.38 
One can see in these arguments deep-seated notions about identity, death and 
symbolic immortality.  By taxing property owned or controlled at death and by 
compelling its liquidation in order to pay taxes, the government is profiting from the 
symbolic death it inflicts.  Inherited property has been characterized as “sacred” and 
the efforts that produced the things are said to have a “sanctity” in the current 
debates about the morality of estate taxation.39  These critics, however, often refer to 
particular types of property, such as a family business or a farm.  This leads to the 
question of whether estate taxation always interferes with symbolic immortality (the 
continuation of one’s family and one’s works). 
                                                                
35MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: 
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 190-91 (1981). 
36ROBERT JAY LIFTON & ERIC OLSON, LIVING AND DYING 76-77 (1974).  Robert Jay Lifton 
wrote of this type of immortality in his article on death, dying and Hiroshima.  Robert Jay 
Lifton, On Death and Death Symbolism: The Hiroshima Disaster, 27 PSYCHIATRY 191, 203 
(1964) [hereinafter Lifton]. 
37LIFTON & OLSON, supra note 36, at 77-78.  See Lifton, supra note 36, at 203-04. 
38HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 95-96 (1958). 
39See, e.g. Meagher, supra note 31, at A22. 
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Some legal scholars have suggested that some types of property may be more 
important to personhood than others.  For example, Margaret Radin has suggested “a 
continuum that ranges from a thing indispensable to someone’s being to a thing 
wholly interchangeable with money.”40  In exploring the loss of objects, Radin stated 
“In general, the moral inquiry for whether fungible property could be taken would be 
the same as the moral inquiry for whether it is fair to impose a tax on this particular 
person.”41  In the takings realm, she argued that “a few objects” may be so personal 
“that no compensation could be just.”42 
Ray Madoff has applied Radin’s insights into property and personality to the area 
of estate tax.43  Generally, the estate tax is imposed on the fair market value of assets 
in the gross estate, usually on the date of the decedent’s death.44  Fair market value is 
“the price at which the property would trade hands between a willing buyer and 
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”45 
Madoff focused on the harm to personhood that may result by taxing the right of 
publicity.  The inclusion of the value of such a right in the wealth transfer tax base 
may compel beneficiaries to exploit a decedent’s name and image in undesired ways 
in order to pay the tax liability.46  The estate tax could necessitate the creation of 
ghostwritten books,47 revivification of discarded manuscripts, the creation of an 
“Ernest Hemingway” line of furniture.48 
Madoff argued that the extent to which “property interests . . . are closely aligned 
with an individual’s identity” varies.  She used Radin’s continuum, ranging from 
“constitutive property” (“a thing indispensable to someone’s being”) to fungible 
property (“a thing wholly interchangeable with money”).49  She argued for varying 
estate tax treatment based upon this understanding, while noting that our current 
estate tax system, in its relief provisions for family farms and businesses, recognizes 
this principle to some extent.50 
Small businesses and farms are leading candidates for classification as 
constitutive property.  A 1904 Atlantic Monthly essay begins with the argument that 
“the small business . . . was a school of character second in importance only to the 
                                                                
40Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 987 (1982). 
41Id. at 1005. 
42Id. 
43Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled Commodification 
of Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759 (1998). 
44I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2032. 
45Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). 
46Madoff, supra note 43, at 762. 
47Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp 1279 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
48See Joe Sharkey, Word for Word/Hemingway Memorabilia, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, 
at § 4, at 7. 
49Id. at 798. 
50Id. at 804 et. seq.  See, eg., I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057. 
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Church.”51  The clergyman who wrote the article contended that dependence on 
customer good will “kept [the small businessman] under an impulse to be courteous 
and honest and considerate and truthful, until these traits become largely 
characteristic.”52  In other words, the author viewed the business holding as 
constitutive of character.  Although not labeled as spiritual immortality, the author 
mentions long range concerns.  The author described “[t]he pride of the merchant, or 
the manufacturer, in the business to which he was giving his life, and which bore his 
name, and which he hoped to make permanent in the community and to transmit to 
his children.”53 
The same sort of praise for small business has been repeated during the twentieth 
century.  A 1945 report to the Senate Small Business Committee highlighted the 
character-building aspects of small business:  “[small business] stimulates expression 
of the fundamental values of thrift, industry, intelligence, schooling, home ties and 
family pride – in short those fireside virtues which have counted for so much in 
developing our strength and character as a nation.”54  In another government report, a 
businessman described his independence, an independence in part inherited.  “I own 
this whole outfit, as a matter of fact, my father did before me. It’s all paid for. In 
addition, I have a little stock and a little farm my grandfather bought up.  So when 
the plants slacken up or close down I can coast for a while.”55  
In small business, then, one could express one’s autonomy and freedom, 
according to this line. The habits of freedom and business sense could be 
transformed into a legacy to be lived out through the lives of one’s children or 
grandchildren and in passing one’s creative product, a business, into the future. 
The idea of constitutive property can extend beyond publicity rights, small 
businesses and farms.  A home can be seen as crucial to one’s identity.  Madoff has 
suggested that death can diminish the constitutive nature of a home.  “[O]nce that 
person has died, the home loses that aspect (although not all aspects) of personal 
                                                                
51Henry A. Stimson, The Small Business as a School for Manhood, 93 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 337, 337 (1904) [hereinafter Stimson].  In many ways, a family farm can be seen as 
a similar sort of constitutive property.  As with small business, there are elements of a strong 
intergenerational commitment to maintenance of farm life.  For a documentary demonstrating 
the constitutive nature of farm property, see TROUBLESOME CREEK:  A MIDWESTERN (West 
City Films, Inc., 1997).  
52Stimson, supra note 51, at 337. 
53Id. at 338-39.  What may distinguish this 1904 view from more contemporary accounts 
is the very heavy contrast drawn between small business and the “great corporations”.  Those 
employed by great corporations were described as “clerks” and “servants” “removed from the 
stimulus, intellectual and moral, which the necessities of meeting the conditions of 
independent business require.”  This hostility to big business in contrast to its small 
counterpart is a hallmark of Progressive Era thinking and could, arguably, justify estate 
taxation of the “swollen fortunes” at the top of the “great corporations.”  Id. at 339-40. 
54SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE-ITS RECORD AND OUTLOOK:  PROGRESS REPORT OF 
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS, S. REP. NO. 79-
47, at 2 (1945). 
55ROWLAND BERTHOFF, INDEPENDENCE AND ENTERPRISE: SMALL BUSINESS IN THE 
AMERICAN DREAM IN SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 39 (Stuart W. Bruchey ed., 1980). 
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identity since that person can no longer live there.”56  Geographic dispersion of 
family members may make a family’s second home intergenerational constitutive 
property.  Nelson Aldrich, Jr. in his recent New York Times essay wrote of such a 
situation.  “Our family’s house is on the New England coast; its view of the ocean is 
a blessing.  All the grace notes of my being originated there.  So did my expectations 
of life, from learning as a boy to make the best of a good sailboat on the 
uncontrollable sea.”57 
Cash and publicly traded stocks seem to be the prototypes of fungible property. 
Money is instrumental, interchangeable, “colorless.”58  Simmel argued that money’s 
“quality consists exclusively in its quantity.”59  He saw that money was both “the 
most complete extension [of the self] that can be derived from an object” and a 
limited extension of ego because its “flexibility is only that of an extremely liquid 
body which takes on any form.60  Yet, money and cash equivalents are not entirely 
fungible.61  Anthropologist Mary Douglas has written that “many of us try to 
primitivize our money . . . by placing restrictions at source, by earmarking monetary 
instruments of certain kinds for certain purposes, by only allowing ourselves or our 
wives certain limited freedoms in the disposal of money.”62  Economist Richard 
Thaler has described what he calls “mental accounting”―“the set of cognitive 
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track 
of financial activities.”63  Economists have observed that households create wealth 
accounts with different degrees of availability for spending.64  People also earmark 
money by the source of funds.65  Gifts as well as death money may be earmarked. 
Such monies are kept separate.  Life insurance proceeds may be set apart.  Wrongful 
death awards may be given to charity.  An inheritance may be seen as a nest egg to 
                                                                
56Madoff, supra note 43, at 799-800.   
57Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr., Estate of the Nation, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 3, 2000, 
at 17.  Aldrich supported the estate tax despite concerns about its effect on the family property.  
For commentary on summer homes, see MARJORIE GARBER, SEX AND REAL ESTATE: WHY WE 
LOVE HOUSES 181-204 (2000). 
58GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 44 (Kurt H. Wolf ed., 1950) (1908), 
cited in VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 1 (1994). 
59GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 259 (David Frisby ed., 2d enlarged edition 
1990) (1907). 
60Id. at 326. 
61Viviana Zelizer has made this argument in The Social Meaning of Money.  ZELIZER, 
supra note 58, at 2, 5.  
62MARY DOUGLAS, PRIMITIVE RATIONING IN THEMES IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 139 
(Raymond Firth ed., 1967), cited in ZELIZER, supra note 58, at 23. 
63Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 241 
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).  I am indebted to Joel Dobris for a reference 
to these materials. 
64Id. at 257-58. 
65Id. at 259. 
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be preserved, or else spent on nonroutine purchases.66  This earmarking process tends 
to make money less fungible, even constitutive. 
Some sense of the nonfungibility of money and its equivalent can be gleaned 
from a recent op-ed in the New York Times.  Stanley Herz described his immigrant 
in-laws who lived frugally, saving money by purchasing AT&T stock. 
His widow, then approaching eighty, was satisfied to have the cushion to 
provide for contingencies (read: nursing home).  And near the end of her 
life, when it was clear that she wouldn’t outlive her assets, she was proud 
she would be leaving money to her daughter and grandchildren. 
Then the stock market took off, and now my wife is about to give Uncle 
Sam a big chunk of Peter and Elsa’s lifetime investments―more than a 
third of everything over $675,000. (The tax is graduated, with a top rate of 
55 percent.)  Most children and grandchildren who must forfeit part of an 
inheritance are from similarly middle-class families were assets arose 
from hard work and steady savings―family values that shouldn’t be 
penalized.67 
The inheritance from Peter and Elsa was seen as a fund expressive of the values in 
their lives.  The money, the AT&T stock had social meaning that could be 
transmitted to the next generation. The savings were, in a sense, a creative product. 
To opponents of the estate tax, the government is a greedy profiteer on death.  In 
this case, death is not actual physical death, but rather a perceived destruction of 
property seen as constitutive of the deceased’s personality, of property that gives to 
one’s successors the fruits of creation whether the product is a name, a farm, a 
business, a summer home or an earmarked fund. 
II.  AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO MORAL HAZARD 
A more modern approach to moral hazard is less character-based and, instead 
uses economic analysis.  In the 1960s economist Kenneth Arrow wrote about health 
insurance addressing “moral hazard”―“the effect of insurance on incentives.”68  
Patients who do not have to pay the full cost for their medical care will be more 
likely to visit doctors and use medical services.  The focus shifts from character to 
incentives.  Economists have argued that this modern “moral hazard” has “little to do 
with morality” and focuses instead on rational people acting in their individual best 
interests.69  Moral hazard can be described as the undesirable consequences of well-
intentioned efforts to share burdens.70 
This same type of moral hazard argument is part of the current debate.  As 
Edward McCaffery has written recently, “The quickest and most important take on 
the immorality of the estate tax is that it falls on the wrong people; that is the wrong 
                                                                
66ZELIZER, supra note 58, at 29. 
67Stanley Herz, Rich? No, Frugal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at A29. 
68Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. 
REV. 941, 961 (1963), cited in Baker, supra note 12, at 567. 
69Baker, supra note 12, at 560-61. 
70Baker, supra note 10, at 239. 
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rich people.  It falls on savers, not spenders.”71 McCaffery, like economists using 
contemporary notions of moral hazard, is concerned about incentive effects.  He does 
distinguish himself from those claiming a “technical”, “scientific” or “amoral” 
stance, with his explicit recognition of the importance of morality to this question.72 
McCaffery does not present evidence demonstrating that the estate tax leads the 
rich to work and save less.73  He argues that incentives in that direction are immoral. 
He writes: 
[A reasonable liberal society] should be wary of its rich spending 
inordinate sums of money on themselves, on their own pleasures, whether 
this is buying up yachts to compete in the America’s Cup, piling up 
trophy houses, or running for elected office on their own considerable 
dimes.  The estate tax is backwards―perverse―on these fronts; it spares 
the spenders, however decadent, and falls heavily on the savers, however 
thrifty and productive.74 
McCaffery’s argument needs to be placed into a larger context in order to really 
consider the morality or moral hazard of the estate tax. Mary Douglas and Baron 
Isherwood in The World of Goods have written: 
But it is interesting to observe the very different values that different 
societies set on the ratio of consumption to income.  Spending only a 
small proportion of income may in one place and time be called thrifty, 
wise and provident; in another it may be held to be miserly, mean and 
wrong.  Conversely, a high ratio of consumption may be approved as 
generous, magnificent, and good in one culture, while in another the 
selfsame behavior may be called spendthrift, feckless and bad.  Evidently, 
the social context that generates the appropriate judgment must be worth 
examining.75 
The debate over the morality of spending has continued through American 
history.76  Those condemning spending have earned prominent places in American 
                                                                
71Edward McCaffery, In Favor of the Repeal in Should We End Life Support for Death 
Taxes?, TAX NOTES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1378. 
72Id. at 1379. 
73Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be, 51 TAX L. REV. 615, 624 (1996) (“I do 
not mean that there necessarily will be more consumption under an estate tax, or more work 
and savings without it.  Rather it is a moral argument; it is one that looks where the tax falls, 
as a matter of principle or fairness.”).  See also Anne Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case 
Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX 
L. REV. 363, 386-88 (1996). 
74McCaffery, supra note 71, at 1380.  I am putting aside for the moment one problematic 
aspect of McCaffery’s argument. A lot of what Thorstein Veblen would call “conspicuous 
consumption”―a trophy or summer house for example can, in fact, result in estate taxation.  
75MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS: TOWARDS AN 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION 12 (1996). 
76DANIEL HOROWITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSUMER 
SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1875-1940 (1985).  Anne Alstott makes the point that savings is not 
always good and spending bad: 
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thought.  Henry David Thoreau set an example of what he called “Spartan 
simplicity” at Walden Pond.77  Thorstein Veblen’s classic, The Theory of the Leisure 
Class, satirized conspicuous consumption by the wealthy.78  The critique of 
consumption extended to the less fortunate as a consumer society took hold in the 
1920s.  In Middletown, a 1929 study of Muncie, Indiana, Robert and Helen Lynd 
saw consumerism displacing a simple, centered small town life at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  In their chapter, “Why Do They Work So Hard,” they wrote: 
The rise of large-scale advertising, popular magazines, movies, radio, and 
other channels of increased cultural diffusion from without are rapidly 
changing habits of thought as to what things are essential to living and 
multiplying optional occasions for spending money.  Installment buying, 
which turns wishes into horses overnight, and the heavy increase in the 
number of children receiving higher education, with its occasions for 
breaking with home traditions, are facilitating this rise to new standards of 
living.79 
Robert Frank’s Luxury Fever, a discussion of luxury consumption over the past 
twenty years, follows the tradition of criticizing consumption of goods that go 
beyond the functional and ordinary.  Frank argues that the spending of the super rich 
“has been a virus, one that’s spawned a luxury fever that, to one degree or another, 
has all of us in its grip.”80  
Against this tradition of moralism, one needs to place a different tradition-- one 
more accepting of consumption.  This tradition saw spending as a way to the higher 
values in life, a route to culture and refinement.  While George Washington 
Vanderbilt’s Biltmore estate with its 125,000 acres and 250 rooms could be seen as 
the epitome of conspicuous consumption, George Gunton praised Biltmore as 
“leading the way to a new direction of devoting American wealth to the uplifting of 
[the] American standard of taste and cultivation.”81 
The core of this “pro-consumption” tradition, however, was focused on middle 
and working class expenditures rather than lavish spending by the wealthy.  In 1907, 
                                                          
The broader point is - once again - that there is nothing intrinsically good about 
savings or bad about consumption, without specifying in more detail how savings 
serve liberal norms like liberty, equality of opportunity or security for the least 
advantaged.  Although savings may promote long-term investment and economic 
growth, the question of the “right” rate of savings is notoriously difficult when taken 
seriously. 
Alstott, supra note 73, at 389. 
77HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 136 (Penguin Books 1983) 
(1854). 
78THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Penguin Books 1994) (1899). 
79ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN MODERN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 81-82 (1956). 
80ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: MONEY AND HAPPINESS IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999).  
For a review of Frank’s book, see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Tyranny of Money, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2126 (2000). 
81George Gunton, The Opening of Biltmore, GUNTON’S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1896, at 34-35, in 
HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 45 n.41. 
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economist Simon Patten wrote, “The new morality does not consist in saving, but in 
expanding consumption . . . We lack . . . courage to live joyous lives, not remorse, 
sacrifice and renunciation.”82  In a series of articles in the years before World War I, 
Martha and Robert Bruère presented case studies of middle class families’ budgets.  
They criticized excessive thrift and an insufficient level of comfort.83  In critiquing 
the Wells family living near Boston, the Bruères admonished Mrs. Wells’ for making 
her clothes at home and “considering her savings too carefully” in purchasing a hat.  
Mrs. Bruère saw the result of thrift as turning “loose an ugly home and ugly clothes 
on an unprotected community.” 84  The Bruères and others argued for more spending 
on goods and refinement, especially for the education and acculturation of children.  
Average middle-class families put aside three hundred dollars for savings, which the 
Bruères characterized as the families’ “most serious financial mistake” causing them 
to “cut off $300 a year from their pleasure and usefulness.”85 
This concern with underconsumption by the working and middle classes was 
particularly high during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Some liberals including 
a contingent of Roosevelt advisers adhered to an underconsumptionist explanation 
for the Depression.86  Industrialists had not passed the productivity gains of the 
1920s to workers in wages, or to consumers with lower prices.  Journalist Stuart 
Chase wrote, “It is not so much overproduction as underconsumption which is the 
appalling fact . . . Millions of tons of additional material could readily be marketed if 
purchasing power were available.  Alas, purchasing power is not available.”87  In a 
1933 speech Roosevelt said: 
The day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we granted 
everything if only he would build, or develop, is over.  Our task now is 
not discovery, or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily 
producing more goods.  It is the soberer, less dramatic business of 
administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to 
reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the 
problem of underconsumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of 
distributing wealth and products more equitably.88 
Estate taxation could play a role in this readjustment.  Some comparable ideas 
were present in Keynesian analysis, although Keynesianism had “only an oblique” 
                                                                
82SIMON N. PATTEN, THE NEW BASIS OF CIVILIZATION 215 (Daniel M. Fox ed., Belknap 
Press 1968) (1907). 
83HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 88. 
84Martha B. Bruère, What Is Home For?, OUTLOOK, Dec. 16, 1911, at 911-12, in 
HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 96-97 n.9.  See also id. at 89. 
85HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 97. 
86ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 
65-85 (1995).  DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN 
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, 122-23 (1999). 
87BRINKLEY, supra note 86, at 70 (citations omitted). 
88THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 1 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 751-52 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1938). 
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influence on New Deal policy.89  By taxing the estates of the wealthy and 
redistributing that money to the less well-off, the hope was that worker spending 
would renew the economy.  Randolph Paul, an important figure in Roosevelt’s 
Treasury Department, gave his account of Keynes’ views on estate taxation and 
consumption: 
This reasoning led to the conclusion that the abstinence, or lack of 
spending, of the rich might impede instead of help the growth of wealth.  
On this premise one of the principal justifications of high-income and 
great wealth fell by the wayside.  Keynes came finally to the conclusion 
that inequality of inheritances stood on a lower basis of justification than 
inequality of income; in his opinion death duties calculated to promote a 
greater propensity to consume might very well promote the growth of 
capital because of the redistribution of wealth they effected.90 
While estate tax opponents see virtue in saving and in its opposite, spending, it is 
important to understand the conflicting strains in the morality of spending.  The 
Veblenesque critique is countered by cautions about oversaving.  Who is spending, 
who is saving? 
The economic version of the moral hazard of the estate tax—its supposed 
suppression of virtuous savings—cannot be the full story.  A focus only on the 
decedent overlooks other effects.  Similar points have been made by Tom Baker with 
respect to insurance (very broadly conceived).  Insurance arrangements benefit not 
only the parties to the contract.  For example, “workers’ compensation supports 
family members and communities who depend on workers’ wages; workers’ 
compensation also benefits coworkers whose health or safety would be compromised 
if injured workers stayed on the job.  Perhaps more importantly, workers’ 
compensation sustains the myth that employers take care of their workers, the myth 
that bodies are not manufacturing inputs, and the myth that people are more 
important than profit.”91  Surely, one can argue that the presence of the estate tax 
provides revenue for governmental programs.  Its presence also suggests that there 
are limits to the extent to which individuals can be given an unequal position in 
society.  As Baker puts it, “Unless and until economic theory can bring these public 
goods into the moral hazard equation, the economics of moral hazard will 
systematically understate the benefits of social responsibility, overstate the costs, 
and, in the process, provide unwarranted support for the current legal and political 
flight from responsibility.”92 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The expansion of moral hazard to include positive externalities suggests that a 
broader perspective on estate taxation is appropriate.  Consideration of the estate tax 
                                                                
89RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (1954). 
90Id. at 230.  I take no position on the underlying economic debates here.  What I do wish 
to do is to highlight the very contingent perceptions of the morality of consumption and the 
role that tax policy can play in implementing views about consumption. 
91Baker, supra note 10, at 288. 
92Id. 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
746 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:729 
should include decedent-centered concerns, such as immortality and incentives to 
save or spend.  However, the analysis cannot end at this point. 
Some estate tax opponents would argue that the tax impedes their ability to 
provide for their families after death and to aid their families in maintaining their 
present standard of living.  One could see the marital deduction as consistent with 
such ideas with respect to a surviving spouse.93  Particularly as the focus moves to 
lower generation heirs, perceptions may alter.  Stanley Herz’s New York Times essay 
on his frugal in-laws94 provoked the following response: 
He and his wife just inherited some $675,000 tax-free plus nearly two-
thirds of some amount above that figure that he, presumably, never 
expected because his in-laws were never wealthy people.  And he is 
complaining about paying taxes on a portion of it?  And if he received this 
largesse tax-free it would somehow reinforce the ‘family values’ of hard 
work and savings?  Why? Because he wouldn’t have to work anymore?95 
If the government could have bad character and provide perverse incentives in a 
decedent-centered view, so those inheriting wealth can be portrayed as corrupted by 
their windfalls, becoming  moral hazards themselves. 
Some reformers have taken this insight seriously, proposing a shift from donor-
based taxation to regimes that impose taxation on the recipients of wealth.96  
Property in the hands of donees or beneficiaries seems less a matter of desert, 
perhaps less constitutive of personality.97  Proposals for an accessions tax or for 
recipient-based income taxation have appeared from time to time.98 
The focus can move beyond family and “the natural objects of one’s bounty” to 
society at large.  As Jane Addams wrote in 1902,  “To attain individual morality in 
an age demanding social morality, to pride one’s self on the results of personal effort 
when the time demands social adjustment is utterly to fail to apprehend the 
situation.”99  Andrew Carnegie portrayed “the man of Wealth” as separate from the 
state and from society, but charged with a trust relationship with the less fortunate.100  
                                                                
93I.R.C. § 2056 (1994). 
94See supra note 67. 
95Charles W. Gossett, Letter to the Editor, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 25, 2000, at A26. 
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One can see in the recent defense of the estate tax by George Soros, William H. 
Gates, David Rockefeller, and Warren Buffett a similar sense of obligation to others 
and support for incentives for charitable contribution.101   
Finally, there is at least one other frame by which one can attempt to evaluate the 
moral hazard of the estate tax.  Progressive economist E.R.A. Seligman’s Essays in 
Taxation, first published in 1895, provided a counterpoint to perspectives dividing 
the individual and the state.  In his critique of the single tax and of the benefit theory 
of taxation, Seligman wrote: 
It is now generally agreed that we pay taxes not because the state protects 
us, or because we get any benefits from the state, but simply because the 
state is a part of us.  The duty of supporting and protecting it is born with 
us.  In civilized society the state is as necessary to the individual as the air 
he breathes; unless he reverts to stateless savagery and anarchy he cannot 
live beyond its confines.  His every action is conditioned by the fact of its 
existence.  He does not choose the state, but is born into it; it is 
interwoven with the very fibres of his being; nay, in the last resort, he 
gives to it his very life.102 
According to Seligman’s argument, the focus on the individual, on family, on 
society at large missed a fundamental point.  “We pay taxes not because we get 
benefits from the state, but because it is as much our duty to support the state as to 
support ourselves or our family; because, in short, the state is an integral part of 
us.”103 
The lens of moral hazard provides a way in which to more critically analyze 
various moral arguments about the estate tax.  In the end, the estate tax provides a 
particularly vivid example of the ways in which taxation touches on questions of 
identity, individuality and one’s relationship to family, to society and to the state.   
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